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Highlights
• The new European Commission has signalled that it will work to create a ‘capital mar-
kets union’. This is understood as an agenda to expand the non-bank part of Europe’s
financial system, which is currently underdeveloped. The aim in the short term is to
unlock credit provision as banks are deleveraging, and in the longer term, to favour a
more diverse, competitive and resilient financial system.
• Direct regulation of individual non-bank market segments (such as securitisation, pri-
vate placements or private equity) might be useful at the margin, but will not per se
lead to significant capital markets development or the rebalancing of Europe’s finan-
cial system away from the current dominance by banks. To reach these goals, the capi-
tal markets union agenda must be broadened to address the framework conditions for
the development of individual market segments. 
• Six possible areas for policy initiative are, in increasing order of potential impact and
political difficulty: (1) regulation of securities and specific forms of intermediation; (2)
prudential regulation, especially of insurance companies and pension funds; (3) regu-
lation of accounting, auditing and financial transparency requirements that apply to
companies that seek external finance; (4) a supervisory framework for financial infra-
structure firms, such as central counterparties, that supports market integration; (5)
partial harmonisation and improvement of insolvency and corporate restructuring fra-
meworks; and (6) partial harmonisation or convergence of tax policies that specifi-
cally affect financial investment. 
Nicolas Véron (n.veron@bruegel.org) is a Senior Fellow at Bruegel and a Visiting Fellow at
the Peterson Institute for International Economics. A version of this Policy Contribution
was prepared for a forthcoming Peterson Institute publication on EU growth policies.
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THE IDEA OF A European Capital Markets Union
(CMU) was introduced by Jean-Claude Juncker on
15 July 2014, in his first policy speech as soon-to-
be-president of the European Commission1. In
September 2014, Jonathan Hill was designated to
join the European Commission with the unwieldy
title of Commissioner for Financial Stability, Finan-
cial Services and Capital Markets Union. To serve
this aim, parts of the European Commission are
being reshuffled to form a new Directorate-General
for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Cap-
ital Markets Union2.
However, CMU remains, at this point, a largely
undefined policy object – or, as the chairman of
the European Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA) put it, “a concept under construction”3. The
construction phase is expected to last at least six
months. Commissioner Hill has announced that
he would “develop an action plan by the summer
of next year [2015] (...) [as a] roadmap to devel-
oping an ambitious Capital Markets Union”4. In this
context, this Policy Contribution is intended as an
initial contribution to the collective work of defin-
ing the CMU’s content and priorities. Since this
work is still at an early stage, it focuses on map-
ping possible relevant areas for forthcoming
policy initiatives, rather than specifying detailed
recommendations.
The CMU idea does not come out of nowhere. The
European Union has implemented policies to
develop and integrate its capital markets for
decades, with a number of successes, particularly
since the late 1990s. It has recently adopted, and
is well on its way towards implementing, a policy
of banking union that will centralise banking
supervision and several other aspects of banking
policy for all countries of the euro area and possi-
bly other EU member states as well. Until the
moment when banking union was initiated in mid-
2012, the fragmentation of Europe’s banking
policy framework was the biggest obstacle to the
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vision of a unified European financial space. Now
that this obstacle is being substantially removed,
it is only logical to examine other barriers to the
free flow of capital across the European economy.
Also logical is the clarification that unlike the bank-
ing union, the CMU would cover all member states
of the EU, including the United Kingdom as it is
host to the largest financial centre in Europe (and,
by some measures, in the world) in London. This
clarification was made early on by Mr Juncker, and
underlined by the choice of a British commis-
sioner for the financial services portfolio.
The economic rationale for CMU is twofold, beyond
the aim of market integration which is the tradi-
tional job description of the European Commis-
sion. First, in the short term, it is a part of the policy
response to anaemic credit growth in the EU and
overdue bank deleveraging following the exces-
sive expansion of bank balance sheets in the five
years before the crisis (2002-07), which is only
now being corrected. The hope is that more
dynamic capital markets and non-bank credit pro-
vision can constitute a ‘spare tyre’ in this context,
to use the expression popularised by then-chair-
man of the Federal Reserve Board Alan Greenspan,
when he advocated a similar policy of capital mar-
kets development in Asia following that region’s
crisis in 1997-985. Second, in the longer term, CMU
is seen as a way to make Europe’s financial
system more efficient and competitive, more
resilient thanks to greater diversity, more respon-
sive to monetary policy signals, and more able to
respond to the financing needs of a vibrant inno-
vation-driven economy. In this respect CMU can
be seen as part of a broader EU-inspired agenda
of structural reform. These two motivations,
respectively cyclical and structural, are mutually
reinforcing at the current juncture.
CMU seeks the expansion of equity and credit
market segments that have been limited in size
until now in comparison to bank intermediation. In
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this sense ‘capital markets’ should be understood
as shorthand for a long list of market segments,
whose common point is that they are not about
bank intermediation. The list includes venture cap-
ital, private equity investment, public equity
issuance and initial public offerings, corporate
bond issuance, corporate debt securitisation, the
direct purchase of loans by insurers and invest-
ment funds from banks, and credit intermediation
by specialised non-bank financial firms, such as
leasing companies or consumer finance compa-
nies. CMU is therefore of a fundamentally differ-
ent nature from banking union: the closeness of
the two policy slogans, banking union and CMU, is
a rather unhelpful false symmetry. In the case of
banking union, the main objective is to centralise
a banking policy framework, the fragmentation of
which along national lines has been proven
deeply dysfunctional in the EU context, because
the incentives of individual national supervisors
to be driven by banking nationalism collided with
their prudential mandate. The aim of banking
union is not to develop banking in the EU; rather it
is to check its existing development with an ade-
quate supervisory system. By contrast, in CMU,
centralisation is not the primary driver and is sub-
ordinated to the developmental agenda.
Nevertheless, a measure of policy centralisation
is needed to realise the CMU ambition of
development of EU capital markets and non-bank
intermediation, for at least three reasons. First, the
crisis has provided a reminder that adequate
regulation is indispensable to a properly
functioning financial system: in accordance with
the subsidiarity principle, such regulation must be
provided at least partly at the scale of the market
itself, which in the CMU vision is pan-European, in
order to avoid loopholes, regulatory arbitrage and
misaligned incentives. Second, experience in
related areas, including competition policy and
banking union itself, suggests that an EU-wide
approach is the best way to overcome entrenched
political economy constraints that have repressed
the development of capital markets and non-bank
finance until now. Third, while banking union and
6. See for example Hugo
Dixon (2014) ‘Unlocking
Europe’s capital markets
union’, Centre for European
Reform (London), October.
‘Capital markets union policy should not seek to freeze market structures in their currently
underdeveloped form but should create a favourable environment for the development of new
intermediation segments and new financing contracts.’
CMU are two separate agendas, there are links
between the two. The consolidation of supervisory
and other banking policies within the banking
union area (which includes the euro area, plus all
non-euro EU member states that may join the
Single Supervisory Mechanism on a voluntary
‘close cooperation’ basis) will inevitably trigger a
need for policy integration in related activities, for
example accounting and auditing policies which
are important inputs to the supervisory
framework.
As noted above, capital markets and non-bank
financial intermediation cover myriads of seg-
ments and sub-segments, and are characterised
by a significant intensity of innovation. CMU policy
should not seek to freeze market structures in
their currently underdeveloped form but, on the
contrary, to create a favourable environment for
the development of new intermediation segments
and new financing contracts, with effective but not
excessive safeguards against systemic risk. In
this respect, it is somewhat odd that some early
suggestions of blueprints for CMU tended to read
as catalogues of market segments, as if each of
these needed to be specifically legislated to fulfil
its potential6. Rather than this curiously dirigiste
impulse, a more growth-friendly CMU approach
should embody a form of financial Ordnungspoli-
tik, setting an adequate framework for the inven-
tion and development of efficient financial
services and contractual arrangements.
An ambitious CMU agenda will face challenges. As
always in finance, it will displace powerful inter-
ests, starting with those of banks, which intensely
dislike the prospect of competition from alterna-
tive financing channels. Banking advocates will
warn against the perils of ‘shadow banking’ and
regulatory arbitrage, while ignoring that their own
core features of deposit collection and high lever-
age justify higher levels of protection against sys-
temic risk. Furthermore, a capital-markets
development agenda will run against deeply-
seated ideological scepticism, particularly in parts
of continental Europe where markets are viewed
7. See International Regula-
tory Strategy Group (2014)
‘Briefing on the principles
that should underpin the
development of a Capital
Markets Union in Europe’,
City of London/TheCityUK.
8. UK House of Lords
(2014) transcript of evi-
dence taken by the Select
Committee on the European
Union, Sub-Committee A on
Economic and Financial
Affairs, 9 September.
a market segment does not necessarily make it
prosper, and the potential impact of such initia-
tives should not be overestimated. However, they
can have beneficial effects if they provide impe-
tus for the removal of unnecessarily restrictive
legislation in various member states. For example,
onerous national rules that require non-bank
lenders that do not take deposits to have a bank-
ing license should be dismantled. The EU legisla-
tion under discussion on European Long-Term
Investment Funds also falls under this category.
2. Review of prudential frameworks
Regulators should reconsider prudential require-
ments that unnecessarily discourage investment
in unrated corporate credit and other market seg-
ments. In banking regulation, there are sugges-
tions that the current version of Basel III is too
harsh on securitisation, and a discussion has
started on their possible relaxation. A wider scope
for review arguably exists in prudential require-
ments on insurers and pension funds, which have
tended to mimic banking requirements, partly
ignoring the fact that these players can legiti-
mately take different risks from banks given the
longer maturity of their liabilities. While so-called
fair-value measurement is generally adequate for
the financial accounting treatment of financial
instruments, it is much less suitable for pruden-
tial accounting, especially of assets that match
long-dated liabilities. The Solvency II Directive (for
insurers) and the Occupational Pension Funds
Directive should be reviewed accordingly, as well
as EU positions in international negotiations,
especially on capital requirements for globally
active insurance firms.
3. Financial transparency, accounting and auditing
Financial information is the lifeblood of capital
markets. While banks can use their relationships
with borrowers to assess their creditworthiness,
non-bank investors generally need reliable public
financial data. The EU decision in 2002 to adopt
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
was a momentous step forward in this area. But
public financial information in the EU remains of
generally insufficient quality and comparability
across member states. Moreover, IFRS are only
mandated for listed companies’ consolidated
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with inherent suspicion. This obstacle is made
more powerful by the failure of economists so far
to produce a convincing model for the financial
sector that would provide a consensus basis to
quantify the economic benefits of market-friendly
reform. Finally, as previously mentioned, the
agenda will have to include a measure of policy
centralisation, even though (unlike in banking
union) this should be seen as a means for devel-
opment of markets and not as an end in itself. This
is sure to elicit robust resistance on grounds of
claims of national sovereignty, in the UK and also
in other member states.
The UK situation is made unique by the high
concentration in London of wholesale market
activity, but also of other segments such as
private equity and hedge funds. Representatives
of the City of London are quick to underline the
benefits that the EU reaps from having a globally
leading financial centre on its territory. But they
generally shy away from acknowledging that a
logical implication must be to align its regulatory
framework with the European public interest and
not only the local one7. As Simon Gleeson, a
prominent British legal expert on financial
services regulation, put it, “we still do not have
sufficient European control of the City of London
to leave other European Governments happy with
the fact that increasingly Europe has only one
financial centre, and that is it”8. This issue must
also be considered within the current UK domestic
political context, marked by uncertainty about
government attitudes to the EU and even about
future continuation of EU membership.
In terms of policy content, an initial mapping sug-
gests six main areas for possible inclusion in the
CMU agenda, listed by increasing order of poten-
tial economic impact and political difficulty.
1. Regulation of specific market segments
This is the area where there is the greatest con-
sensus and the one that has been most com-
mented on so far. Possible items include a
definition of simple and transparent securitisation
products, amendments to the Transparency Direc-
tive to facilitate medium-sized companies’ market
access and some harmonisation of frameworks
for private placements. As noted earlier, regulating
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9. On a related theme, it is
worth noting that the ECB
has taken steps towards
the gradual formation of a
credit register that would
cover the entire banking
union area. See the ECB
Decision of 24 February
2014 on the organisation of
preparatory measures for
the collection of granular
credit data by the European
System of Central Banks,
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
ecb/legal/pdf/oj_jol_2014_10
4_r_0008_en_txt.pdf. 
10. Note: the author is an
independent board member
of the Global Trade
Repository arm of DTCC, an
FMI firm.
11. So far the European
Commission has been
reluctant to include insol-
vency law within the scope
of its harmonisation agenda
under the internal market
policy, and has preferred to
rely mostly on non-binding
recommendations, except
for the limited purpose of
assigning jurisdiction in
cross-border insolvencies.
See eg ‘Commission Recom-
mendation of 12 March
2014 on a new approach to
business failure and insol-
vency’, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content
/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32
014H0135&from=EN. 
2016 at the latest. The EU should advocate the
establishment of a global (treaty-based)
supervisor and resolution authority for
international CCPs, with the establishment of an
EU-wide supervisory and resolution agency for
CCPs as a second-best alternative.
5. Insolvency and debt restructuring frameworks
As has been highlighted by numerous studies,
European insolvency frameworks tend to work too
slowly, to result too often in liquidation and to pro-
tect effectively neither employment nor private
creditor rights. The reasons include historical lega-
cies and entrenched special interests, excessive
protection of government and government-linked
creditors, inadequate organisation and function-
ing of insolvency courts, and moralistic prejudices
against corporate failure. Furthermore, insolvency
frameworks tend to differ considerably from one
member state to another, hampering the emer-
gence of pan-European credit markets, not least
for securitisation. In addition, out-of-court restruc-
turing is underdeveloped in Europe, particularly in
comparison to the US. While European insolvency
reform would be a challenging endeavour both
technically and politically, it should be a key com-
ponent of an ambitious CMU agenda11. Full har-
monisation is unlikely to be a realistic objective in
this area, partly because of the links between
insolvency legislation and idiosyncratic national
constitutional arrangements. However, EU frame-
work legislation could help overcome national
obstacles and even partial harmonisation might
foster cross-border market integration. Separately,
in order to move towards a more complete banking
union, a specific European insolvency regime
should be created for banks, at least the largest
ones.
6. Taxation
Differences between national tax regimes for sav-
ings products represent a major obstacle to cross-
border capital markets integration. Member states
should seek more convergence in this area, either
financials, and single-entity accounts and finan-
cial reporting of unlisted groups (including many
banks supervised by the European Central Bank)
still use divergent national accounting standards.
Furthermore, even IFRS reporting is audited by
audit firms that are organised and regulated on a
national and often divergent basis, and enforced
by national capital markets authorities, resulting
in widespread non-convergent ‘nostalgic account-
ing’ (perpetuating some accounting practices
linked to the national standards that were
replaced by IFRS in the 2000s), which hampers
financial reporting quality and comparability. A
reform agenda could include (1) harmonising EU
regulation of auditors and creating an EU regula-
tor for the largest audit firms (something that
recently adopted EU audit legislation signally
failed to achieve); (2) establishing a European
Chief Accountant with authority over IFRS enforce-
ment, either within the European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA) or as a new EU agency;
and (3) requiring the use of IFRS by all unlisted
banks, to enable consistent banking supervision9.
4. Supervision of financial infrastructure
The regulatory framework that applies to financial
market infrastructure (FMI) firms in the EU is
largely harmonised, and many such companies
already operate on a cross-border or pan-
European basis10. However, those FMIs that carry
potential systemic risk, primarily central
counterparties (CCPs, known as clearing houses
in the US), remain subject to national frameworks
for their supervision, contingent liquidity support,
recovery and resolution. This results in serious
actual or potential barriers to cross-border capital
market integration, as illustrated by the recent
experience in banking and by the ongoing
lawsuits of the UK government against the ECB
concerning claims of discrimination against non-
euro area based CCPs in its liquidity-support
framework. This issue will become increasingly
salient with the expected move towards central
clearing of large swathes of the over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives market, scheduled in 2015 or
‘Financial market infrastructure firms that carry potential systemic risk, primarily central
counterparties, remain subject to national supervisory and resolution frameworks. This results
in serious actual or potential barriers to cross-border capital market integration.’
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by unanimity or through enhanced cooperation,
as well as simplification and stabilisation of
national tax regimes. In addition, the EU should
build on existing studies and national experiences
to explore a rebalancing of the current differenti-
ated tax treatment of equity and debt, which gen-
erally favours the latter to the detriment of the
former.
The third and fourth of these areas could result in
the transfer of some regulatory and supervisory
functions from the national to the EU level. It would
be a mistake to bar such transfer as an a priori
political no-go. EU-level supervision already exists
within ESMA, for derivatives trade repositories and
credit rating agencies. President Juncker’s mis-
sion letter to Commissioner Hill asks him to reform
ESMA’s governance and funding: this reform
should include consideration of ESMA’s current
and possible future expanded role as a supervi-
sor, or whether EU-level supervisory functions for
non-bank firms would be better placed in one or
several new agencies to be created. A location in
London for such a new agency or agencies, or for
new functions to be developed within ESMA, could
be envisaged to meet concerns in the UK that EU-
level supervision might become too remote from
Europe’s main financial centre.
The EU debate over the next few months should
determine whether a realistic CMU agenda for the
next five years could include all six above-listed
items or only some of them, and what prioritisa-
tion and/or time sequence might be chosen to
maximise actual impact. The European Commis-
sion will need to consult widely with EU member
states, relevant non-EU benchmarks, industry
segments and experts. It will face challenging
trade-offs. But the larger point is that, thanks in no
small part to the progress made towards banking
union, the promise of more integrated capital mar-
kets that would powerfully serve the EU economy
has become much less utopian. This promise
should not be neglected or merely tinkered with.
Capital Markets Union can become a major com-
ponent of the European agenda of structural
reform, and the current moment of opportunity
should not be missed.
